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1 Abstract—Blockchain technology has been showing its strong
performance on decentralized security when integrating with
Internet of Things network. However, the trilemma of scalability-
security-decentralization exists in Blockchain-based IoT. Therein
the typical round-robin scheduling implemented in the Byzantine
Faulty Tolerance (BFT) proposed by Neo’s Blockchain has a
significant delay when consecutive faulty miners exist. This paper
proposes a novel analysis model for evaluating the network
performance collapse in general, followed by an optimized round-
robin scheduling for the case when the mutual latency difference
is not significant enough for ranking. Based on the model, the
optimized mechanism is able to increase the block rate for a
specific subset of consecutive faulty miners by nearly 50% and
provide a linearly positive growth rate of the mitigation with
respect to the fail rate of a single miner, which strongly promotes
the efficiency of the P2P-based BFT consensus algorithm.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Consensus, Byzantine Faulty
Tolerance, Blockchain, Network Performance Collapse
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) has been emerged in both academia
and industry since early 2000s as one of the core technologies
and ecosystems of the Next Generation Network with massive
numbers of sensors and actuators widely spread, as well as
nodes with powerful computational strength. It is usually re-
garded as the extension of traditional Internet while an IoT
network allows the medium of each node changed from a
strong device to a tiny chip or a sensor that can be embedded
into wherever necessary. However, there exists a complicated
issue that a huge amount of data streams transmitted within
an IoT network that consists of billions of IoT devices has
significant impacts upon the security of centralized servers.
Decentralization is a potential solution where the most difficult
challenge is to investigate a method to reach the consensus
within a given period in a decentralized manner. That means
only a unique result survives.
Blockchain, the kernel of BitCoin [1], is featured with its
decentralized tamper-resistance based on a Peers-to-Peers(P2P)
network. A P2P network ensures that the entities among
the physical network are relatively identical compared with
a Client-Server network. Precisely by design, a Blockchain-
based database can therefore constitute a trust-free decentral-
ized system. Note that trust-free means the conventional party
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as an arbitral body is filled in by common cryptographical
theorems. This promotes Blockchain to be a suitable role for
data recording, storage and identity management, especially for
those sensitive data [2]. Bitcoin and Ethereum [3], being famous
for the first cryptocurrency that has practically solved double-
spending and the first Blockchain that provides decentralized
application platform [4], respectively, have been proved their
real-world value with the potential in providing tamper-resistant
and distributed ledger service. The only possibility to redically
attack and destroy a Blockchain system is to have a 51% attack
where the number of faulty miners should be more than half.
We believe such tamper-resistance property of Blockchain can
be of significant value in ensuring trust in IoT systems.
In hopes of converging to a unique result without any
forking, a consensus algorithm turns out to be one of the core
modules in a Blockchain system. There are some well-known
consensus algorithms including Proof-of-Work(PoW), Proof-
of-Stake(PoS) and Byzantine Faulty Tolerance(BFT). Practical
BFT(PBFT) [5] is thought as the first feasible BFT algorithm
to be implemented in live environment. In the context of PBFT,
not all the nodes that have joined in the P2P network are able
to participate in consensus process unless owning certain ratio
of stakes or a valid certificate.
A Blockchain Survey [6] compared Public Blockchain with
Consortium Blockchain in terms of multiple properties. Con-
cretely, in terms of Consensus Determination, how to define a
Blockchain is public or consortium is to distinguish whether a
fair and random selection from a set of eligible nodes has been
based on their hash power/stake or not, but not “all miners”.
In terms of Immutability, whether a Blockchain system is
immutable or not does not depend on its decentralization but
the minimum cost spent on destroying the Blockchain system.
A Blockchain being consortium does not constitute its less
powerful immutability if its market caps is even greater than
that of a relatively less popular public chain. In the context
of a stable IoT industry, there may be only a small set of
nodes owned by multiple business parties to be the miners in
a consortium chain, where a round-robin scheduling is usually
introduced among these miners to decide a unique miner each
round in order to achieve the high scalability. Besides, it is
also of importance to prevent the system from data-leaking.
Therefore, in the absence of the high level of privacy protection
that has not been mature enough to be applied yet, such as
Fig. 1. 3-phase consensus process of P2P-Based BFT.
Ring-Signature [7] and Zero-knowledge Proof [8], a consortium
chain is preferable for IoT technologies and PBFT turns out to
be an ideal consensus algorithm.
This paper is focusing on an optimized round-robin schedul-
ing used in PBFT. The mechanism solves the latency problem
when the latency is uncertain or difference among each sample
is not significant enough to be weighed so that ranking will not
be easily achieved. It may not behave as expected,
• Even if miners are geographically located closely, the
topology of routers in access-layer may still have an
unignorable effect.
• The fluctuating is even greater than the difference among
each sample.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses Neo’s work on PBFT. In Section III, the problem
of network performance collapse in PBFT system is stated. In
Section IV an optimized system is presented, followed by the
simulation and analysis of the optimized system based on the
proposed novel model in Section V. In Section VI, conclusions
and future work are drawn.
II. REVIEW THE CONSENSUS SYSTEM
Castro, M. and Liskov, B. proposed PBFT by which dozens
of miners are able to securely achieve consensus with O(n2)
given that f ≤ n−13 where f denotes the number of faulty
miners while n denotes the total number of miners maintained
in a list. The list can be static or dynamic. To simplify the
question so that we can focus on the scheduling issue, all
workarounds such as election of proposing for or against
members (dynamic) will be neglected. In order to integrate
PBFT with current Blockchain architecture and make it more
compatible, Neo [9], the most famous Chinese Blockchain
Project, proposed P2P-Based BFT [9] in which the Client-
Server architecture is replaced with a P2P-based architecture
so that 5-phase consensus process can be at most simplified to
3-phase in the context of consortium chain, which is shown in
Fig. 1. Table I shows the necessary symbols.
A static round-robin list is maintained by all miners so that
everyone is aware of the miner who will be G′(h+1) (speaker)
by comparing p and its own i.
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF NECESSARY SYMBOLS IN NEO’S SYSTEM
Symbol Description




V ChangeV iew message
G Actual miner of the block
G′ Potential miner of the block
S Signature of B
SV Signature of V
t Block period
µ Timer starting from the beginning of a new round,
2v+1 × t
i Sequence number of each miner in the static list
n Total number of miners in the list
h Current height of the canonical chain
v View number, increased by 1 if a ChangeV iew
phase starts, return to zero if B(h+1) ∈ C
p (h− v) mod n
f Maximum number of faulty miners can be tolerated,
n−1
3
1) Request: The speaker proposes B(h+1) with Sp(h+1)
that will be broadcast to all other delegators (i 6= p)
afterwards. Also v(h) = 0.
2) Response: Any i has received a Request message and
verified the validity, B(h + 1) will be broadcast to all
other miners including both speaker and other delegators
with Si(h+ 1).
3) Agreement: Any i has received and validated Response
messages from no less than n−f different i, it will imme-
diately broadcast an Agreement attached with B(h+ 1)
and Si(h+ 1) collected from n− f different i, by which
“Negotiation Signatures” can be generated for the validity
of B(h+ 1). Also G(h+ 1)← G′(h+ 1), indicates this
round has been successful, B(h+1) ∈ C. A new round
will start and miners move back to Request phase.
4) ChangeView: If Agreement phase cannot be achieved
before µ, i moves to ChangeV iew phase and broadcasts
a ChangeV iew message to all other miners including
both speaker and other delegators with SVi(h). Any i
has received and validated ChangeV iew messages from
no less than n − f different i, v(h) ← v(h) + 1 will
be broadcast to all miners. Finally the whole consensus
process moves back to Request phase, and decides the
new G′(h+ 1) by comparing new p and i.
Note that around a dozen or two of miners can be thought
as the most usual number of miners contained in the static list
for most PBFT systems. Therein, n = 21 is the number of
delegators that participate in a certain round in DPoS-BFT of
EOS [10], which is being thought as the most practical value
with the lower minimum of efficiency. Both Neo’s P2P-based
BFT and the optimized mechanism proposed in this paper are
subjected to this rule. All analysis and simulation in the rest of
this paper also follow this rule.
EOS Blockchain aims for a round-robin scheduling based
on a parameter where geography and latency are weighted
so that honest and available G′(h + 1) can be regularly
decided. What will lead to is the probability that falling into
ChangeV iew phase can be tremendously reduced. Indeed, it is
of an appropriate approach if miners are separated globally as
multiple subsets [10]. However, as previously stated in Section
I, latency becomes too small and random to be the basis to
decide G′(h+ 1) if miners locate closely with each other, for
which another feasible solution that modifies the mechanism of
ChangeV iew phase is necessary.
Therefore, it is worth investigating the circumstance that a
set of consecutive miners being faulty, which can be happening
very likely in living environment. Given some examples as
below,
• Multiple processes launched on one single cloud instance
will all be killed once the instance is somehow turning
faulty.
• Multiple sets containing more than one faulty miners
usually exist if f is big enough.
There exists a network performance collapse in P2P-based BFT
system when multiple consecutive miners become faulty. This
paper proposes a novel model to analyze the network perfor-
mance collapse followed by the optimized system that improves
the network performance in the context of the proposed model,
as well as its evaluation.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MODELLING ANALYSIS
Note that the case in which f > n−13 is neglected for the rest
of this paper, as no new block can be generated and the process
will indefinitely get stuck in the ChangeV iew phase. For all
cases in which f ≤ n−13 , a novel analysis model is proposed to
evaluate the network performance collapse as follows.
A. A Novel Analysis Model
f can be separated into multiple combinations of
[f1, f2, . . . , fm] via Φ(P, n, f), indicating that there are
m subsets of faulty miners. Note that < can be one of the
combinations or exactly f itself. Also note that P denotes the
Partition function P [11], while Φ denotes a vector consisting
of the probability that each possible combination happens,
excluding the combination with all-ones. fi consists of one or
more consecutive faulty miners. An example where n = 13,
f = 4 is given as follows,















P (f) = P (4) = 5 (1)
The vector in (1) contains the probability that each of
[(4), (1, 3), (1, 1, 2), (2, 2)] happens. The corresponding model
with all combinations is shown in Fig. 2. It indicates that there
exist 4 combinations excluding all-ones, which matches with
P (4)− 1 = 4.
(a) (1, 1, 1, 1), neglectable
(b) (1, 1, 2) (c) (1, 3)
(d) (2, 2) (e) (4)
Fig. 2. All combinations if n = 13, f = 4.
This model is general for a round-robin scheduling in any
consensus systems given that,
f ≤ n− 1
3
; (2a)
G(k) = G(k + n),
k is the first successful block number when starting
to observe the model. (2b)
B. Neo’s System
Given that the previous model, there arises a question. How
long does it need to take to step over f given that f ≤ n−13 if
the original Neo’s algorithm is being used? It can be solved
by obtaining the delay T and block rate R via the following
process. Firstly, the consensus process is shown in Fig. 3.
Note that whoever keeping a token can be the potential speaker
of current round. The lower right-arrows with h = h0 starting
from m to n indicate that a miner with i = m passes the token
to a miner with i = n as n being the potential speaker of
the round of h = h0. The upper left-arrows with v(h) = v′
starting from n to m indicate that a miner that is the current
potential speaker with i = n passes the token back to a miner
with i = m as m being the next potential speaker of the round
of h = h0 with the view number v increasing to v′.
As shown in Fig. 3, the arrow steps backward, that is,
p(h, v(h))← (p(h, v(h))− 1) , if v(h)← v(h) + 1; (3)
Fig. 3. The consensus process of P2P-based BFT of Neo’s Blockchain.
p(h+ 1, v(h+ 1))← (p(h, 0) + 1) ,
if B(h+ 1) ∈ C ∧ v(h+ 1)← 0. (4)
In the case of f ≤ n−13 , f can be separated into multiple
combinations of [f1, f2, . . . , fm]. There are m subsets of faulty
miners and each of them contains fi consecutive faulty miners.
The system needs to take the following delay to step over all











(2l − 1) = 2t(2f+1 − 2− f)
(5)
Toriginalf = 2t(2
f+1 − 2− f) + (f − 1)t, f > 0 (6)
T =
∑
Tf , where f =
m∑
i=0




T0 equals to a normal block period. (6) implies that the original
Neo’s algorithm has a network performance collapse with
O(2n+1). Therein, T in (7) denotes the total delay to step over
n rounds with block rate R shown as (8). Note that stepping
over n rounds is equivalent to stepping over f if the delay for
the rest of non-faulty miners are treated as zeros in each of
the combination set, that is T0 × (n − |f|). Such a network
performance collapse is unacceptable for a consortium chain
system.
IV. OPTIMIZE THE CONSENSUS SYSTEM
TABLE II
DESCRIPTION OF ADDITIONAL SYMBOLS IN THE OPTIMIZED SYSTEM
Symbol Description
k Counter to skip the leftover consecutive faulty miners
in <. Note that <[i,i+f−1] is equivalent to fi with
f faulty miners. f = fi = < is the worst case, that is
[(4)] in Fig. 2.
p (h+ v + k) mod n, where k(0) = 0.
Fig. 4. The optimized consensus process.
The consensus process is shown in Fig. 4, as well as the
additional symbols is shown in Table II.
Note that all symbols denoted in Fig. 4 follow the same rules
as Fig. 3, except that the upper left-arrows turn to be rightward.
As shown in Fig. 4, the arrow steps forward until reaching the
first available miner i′ /∈ <[i,i+f−1]. In other words, i′ /∈ fi
when introducing the model proposed in Section III. The arrow
comes to a standstill for k+1 rounds until v(h) = 0. Even if it
is in the worse case that <[i,i+f] ⊂ ∅ while
∣∣<[i+f,i+2f−1]∣∣ = |f|
and i′ ∈ <[i+f,i+2f−1] (In our model, it can be denoted as f ′i




(max{0, k(h)− 1}) , if v(h) = 0; (9a)
(v(h)− 1 + k(h)) , otherwise. (9b)
p and v behave as (3) and (4), with an additional counter k.
Given that k(0) = 0, when B(h+ 1) is successfully generated,
k stores the state of v if v 6= 0 so that µ becomes independent,
as shown in (9a). On the other hand, k decreases by one every
round given that k ∈ N. Thus the arrow is prevented from
moving backwards to faulty miners and comes to a standstill
until k = 0 , as shown in (9b).
In the case of f ≤ n−13 , f can be separated into multiple
combinations of [f1, f2, . . . , fm]. There are m subsets of faulty
miners and each of them contains fi consecutive faulty miners.








2k = t(2f+1 − 2), f > 0
(10)
(10) implies that the optimized mechanism mitigates the net-
work performance collapse to the one with only O(2n), which
can promote a specific subset of consecutive faulty miners with
a decrement of nearly 50%. The corresponding delay T and
block rate R can be obtained by (7) and (8). Note that due to
the fact that Toriginal1 = T
optimized
1 , T is independent to the
change of the mechanism with all-ones combination. Therefore
fi = [1, 1, 1, 1] in Fig. 2 is neglectable.
In addition, Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 show
the implementation in detail.
• Algorithm 1 shows the complete process of ChangeV iew
phase and how it affects the election of the current speaker.
It is shown that an infinite for-loop is being activated for
a current mining work. Therein a concurrent channel is
being opened for the timer of ChangeV iew, while the
election is in progress by comparing p and i outside the
channel. Every time the mining work is initialized or
a ChangeV iew is active, Algorithm 2 is invoked from
which a new v and p can be obtained. Once B(h + 1)
is successfully generated and broadcast, Algorithm 3 is
invoked.
• Algorithm 2 implements p = (h+ v + k) mod n.
• Algorithm 3 implements (9a) and (9b).
The proposed optimized mechanism can prove the gener-
ality of the analysis model in Section III by providing the
performance simulation followed by the analysis in Section V.
According to the result of the analysis, the improvement of the
mechanism can also be proved.
V. PERFORMANCE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, Golang is used for simulations due to its
strong performance on concurrency and distributed architecture.
Ethereum platform whose client is also written by Golang
is used in our simulation environment. In our simulations,
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 are simulated via the testnet of Ethereum
platform. Fig. 7 is simulated via a Golang-based ring structure.
The following simulations are conducted and followed by the
corresponding interpretations.






















Simulated Neo’s P2P−Based BFT
Simulated Optimized P2P−Based BFT
Calculated Optimized P2P−Based BFT
Calculated Neo’s P2P−Based BFT
Fig. 5. Comparison between Neo’s and Optimized P2P-Based BFT in terms
of the maximum f.
Fig. 5 shows Neo’s and Optimized P2P-Based BFT in terms
of the maximum f. f = n−13 as n gets increased. It is shown
that the time consumption on stepping over f of the optimized
mechanism proposed in this paper falls behind that of Neo’s
mechanism with an increased rate as n gets increased. Due to
the number of n getting restricted to a range around dozens,
it can be concluded that the optimized mechanism is able to
increase the efficiency for a specific subset of consecutive faulty
miners by nearly 50%.
Fig. 6 shows Neo’s and Optimized P2P-Based BFT in terms
of a fixed n = 21 and an increasing f. That is f ∈ [1, n−13 ]. It
is shown that Neo’s mechanism has an order of O(2n+1) while
that of the optimized mechanism proposed is O(2n).
Fig. 7 involves the fail rate of a single miner. It is shown that
in Fig. 7(a), both the weighted block rate of Neo’s mechanism
Algorithm 1: Process of ChangeV iew
Input: blockPeriod denotes the period a speaker needs to
sleep to wait for the synchronization. view
denotes the view number that is initially set to be
zero. N denotes the number of miners contained
in the static list. index denotes the index number
of the local miner.
Output: A new block with its height number h, denoted
as B(h+ 1).
1 Assert(view = 0)
2 k ← Block(h).k, where Block(0) = 0
3 Timeout(timer, start, view, blockPeriod) ← timer >
start + 2view+1 × blockPeriod
4 for Mining(h+ 1) = TRUE do
5 Parameters ← NewRound(view, k)
6 while ? TRUE do
7 start ← Time().Now
8 timer ← Time().Timer
9 if Timeout(timer, start, view, blockPeriod)
then
10 /* ChangeV iew(view) opens a new
concurrent channel in which
11 “ if Timeout(Time().Timer, Time().Now,
view + 1, blockPeriod) then return
TIMEOUT else return DONE ” */
12 viewnew, status ← ChangeV iew(view)
13 if status = TIMEOUT then
14 viewnew, status ←
ChangeV iew(viewnew)
15 else if status = DONE then
16 Assert(viewnew = view + 1)
17 view ← viewnew
18 Parameter ← NewRound(view, k)
19 close all concurrent channels
20 for Parameters has not been renewed do
21 if index = Parameters.p then
22 Local miner is a speaker. Propose a new
Block.
23 UpdateK(Parameters)
24 else if index 6= Parameters.p then
25 Local miner is a delegator. Wait for a new
Block.
26 UpdateK(Parameters)
27 Block(h+ 1).k ← k and final
28 Note that while ? indicates a concurrency loop.
Algorithm 2: Process of NewRound
Input: view denotes the view Number at current round. k
denotes the new memory counter.
Output: The new set of Parameters.
1 Parameters.v, Parameters.p ← view, (h + view + k)
mod N
Algorithm 3: Process of UpdateK
1 if return(B(h+ 1)) then
2 if Parameters.v = 0 then
3 k ← Max(0, k − 1)
4 else
5 k ← k + Parameters.v − 1
6 break Mining() and close while ?
and that of the optimized mechanism increase as the fail rate
gets increased, with the optimized curve having a shift-down
and a tiny decreasing of its gradient. It is concluded that
there exists an increasing growth rate of difference between
the weighted block rate obtained from Neo’s mechanism and
the optimized mechanism, as the fail rate gets increased, which
is shown in Fig. 7(b).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we managed to improve the performance of
BFT-like consensus algorithms in the context of a consortium-
chain-based IoT network without any explicit latency gaps. This
paper showed that the round-robin scheduling proposed by P2P-
based BFT of Neo’s Blockchain has a delay with an order of
nearly O(2n+1) in ChangeV iew phase given that f ≤ n−13 .
This paper also proposed a novel analysis model for evaluating
the network performance collapse in general, followed by an
optimized round-robin scheduling when the mutual latency
difference is not significant enough for ranking. Based on
the model, the optimized mechanism is able to increase the
block rate for a specific subset of consecutive faulty miners
by nearly 50% and provide a linearly positive growth rate of
the mitigation with respect to the fail rate of a single miner,






















Simulated Neo’s P2P−Based BFT
Simulated Optimized P2P−Based BFT
Calculated Neo’s P2P−Based BFT
Calculated Optimized P2P−Based BFT
Fig. 6. Comparison between Neo’s and Optimized P2P-Based BFT in terms
of n = 21.





























Simulated Neo’s P2P−Based BFT
Simulated Optimized P2P−Based BFT
Calculated Neo’s P2P−Based BFT
Calculated Optimized P2P−Based BFT
(a) Comparison between Neo’s and Optimized P2P-Based BFT in terms of the
fail rate of a single miner and the block rate.























(b) Comparison between Neo’s and Optimized P2P-Based BFT in terms of the
fail rate of a single miner and the growth rate of block rate.
Fig. 7. Comparison with respect to the fail rate of a single miner.
which strongly promotes the efficiency of the P2P-based BFT
consensus algorithm. We believe that our proposed analysis
model and optimized round-robin scheduling that is based on
P2P-based BFT will be helpful for any analysis and potential
improvements upon any BFT-like consensus algorithms.
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